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Venezuela Undermines Gold Miner
Crystallex’s Attempts to Recover on Its
ICSID Award
SAM WESSON*

I. INTRODUCTION
This article follows an investment dispute that arose after the
Venezuelan government refused to grant a Canadian mining company an
environmental permit. Its refusal effectively denied the company its
rights to mine Las Cristinas, one of the largest proven gold deposits in the
world.1 The denial came after Crystallex International Corporation
(“Crystallex”) had spent over 500,000,000 United States Dollars
(“USD”) getting Las Cristinas to the “shovel-ready stage.”2 In response
to Venezuela’s expropriation of the mine, an International Centre for
Settlement of Investment Disputes (“ICSID”) tribunal awarded
Crystallex 1,200,000,000 USD in compensation in 2016 (the “Award”).3
In November 2017, Crystallex set aside that compensatory award,
enforceable now, for a settlement in installments from a country facing
* J.D. Candidate 2019 at Loyola Law School, Los Angeles. B.A. in History 2015, U.C. Santa
Cruz. This paper is a student note written primarily in 2017-18. I would like to thank Professor
Hiro Aragaki and James Trotter for their time and advice. Thank you also to the members of ILR.
I have enjoyed working with you all over the past two years.
1. Crystallex Int’l Corp. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venez., ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/11/2,
Award, ¶ 7 (Apr. 4, 2016) [hereinafter Crystallex Int’l Corp, ICSID Award.]. See Corporate Profile,
CRYSTALLEX, http://www.crystallex.com/Company/CorporateProfile/default.html (last visited
Sept. 7, 2018).
2. Crystallex Int’l Corp, ICSID Award, ¶ 195.
3. Id. ¶ 961.
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insolvency, and then Venezuela reneged on the settlement.4 This article
will explore why the parties likely made these moves. The short answer:
Venezuela in its current political, economic, and legal position is largely
incompatible with the ICSID system, meaning that for Crystallex and for
Venezuela’s other claimant creditors, the only thing that is certain about
collecting on an ICSID award is that they must pay their legal fees.
Crystallex is a mining company based out of Toronto, Canada.5 The
company was traded publicly on the OTCB Marketplace until 2011.6 Its
founders formed the company to develop and operate gold mines in South
America.7 The expropriated Las Cristinas site served as Crystallex’s
biggest investment and potential reward.8 In 2011, when the Venezuelan
government under Hugo Chávez nationalized the gold industry and took
back Las Cristinas, it put Crystallex into bankruptcy. 9 Crystallex
responded by initiating arbitration against Venezuela at ICSID. 10 Upon
securing its Award in 2016, the company secured litigation financing
from a hedge fund to gain the funds necessary to collect on that Award in
the United States.11
Crystallex now has registered its Award in the United States. 12
However, it has not yet succeeded in executing on Venezuelan assets as
of March 2019.13 Back in November of 2017, Venezuela and Crystallex
reached a settlement agreement for payment of an undisclosed sum in
exchange for Crystallex dropping its execution efforts.14 Yet, as of July
4. See Shayna Posses, Venezuela, Crystallex Deal Ok’d In $1.2B Mine Row, LAW 360 (Nov.
27, 2017), https://www.law360.com/articles/988254/venezuela-crystallex-deal-ok-d-in-1-2b-mine
-row; infra Part VI.
5. See Corporate Profile, supra note 1.
6. See Crystallex Informed of TSX Delisting, CRYSTALLEX (Dec. 07, 2011),
http://www.crystallex.com/News/PressReleases/PressReleaseDetails/2011/Crystallex-Informedof-TSX-Delisting1127584/default.html.
7. Corporate Profile, supra note 1.
8. Id. See Reuters, Crystallex files for bankruptcy, FIN. POST (Dec. 23, 2011),
http://business.financialpost.com/commodities/mining/crystallex-files-for-bankruptcy.
9. Crystallex files for bankruptcy, supra note 8.
10. Crystallex Int’l Corp, ICSID Award, ¶ 61.
11. See Litigation Funding Paves Way for Crystallex’s $1.4B Award Against Venezuela,
BENTHAM IMF BLOG (Apr. 6, 2016), https://www.benthamimf.com/blog/blog-full-post/benthamimf-blog/2016/04/06/third-party-funding-paves-way-for-crystallex-s-$1.4b-award-againstvenezuela.
12. Crystallex Int’l Corp. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venez., 244 F. Supp. 3d 100, 122 (D.D.C.
2017).
13. Tom Hals, Crystallex pursues Citgo as Venezuela misses settlement payment, Rᴇᴜᴛᴇʀꜱ
(Dec. 21, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/venezuela-crystallex/crystallex-pursues-citgo-asvenezuela-misses-settlement-payment-idUSL1N1OL2BG.
14. See Jonathan Wheatley, Crystallex reaches settlement in legal fight with Venezuelan
government, FIN. TIMES (Nov. 24, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/1526fb0d-ece1-30e8-93eb889be393cd0d.
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2018, Crystallex was still awaiting Venezuela’s first substantial
payment.15 Meanwhile, Crystallex continued to litigate against Venezuela
in multiple United States district and circuit courts, as it attempted to
execute on Venezuela’s assets.16 Notably, Crystallex is now attempting
to execute on the assets of the Venezuela state-owned oil company’s
subsidiaries.17 Venezuela’s many claimants and creditors are watching
this litigation closely because it will determine the fate of billions of
dollars of Venezuela-related assets held in the United States.
Simultaneously, Venezuela and the governments of ICSID-contracting
member states are watching Crystallex’s precedent-setting effort to
execute on Venezuelan assets in the United States. The precedent set by
Crystallex and Venezuela in this matter may affect how the execution of
investor-state arbitration awards will be conducted in the future. Now
(March 2019), Crystallex is getting closer to the assets of this
incompatible state. Yet, this fight is far from over.
“Incompatible state” is the term that I am using to describe states,
like Venezuela, who cooperate with the ICSID proceedings but are
unwilling or unable to pay out on awards, i.e., “defiant” but “compliant”
states. These states use a mixture of political and legal maneuvers to
simultaneously comply with their obligations under Bilateral Investment
Treaties (“BITs”) and the ICSID Convention and, yet, avoid honoring
judgments decided against them. A state’s transition from conforming
contracting state to incompatible state can happen as quickly as when
there is a downturn in the economy or a change in the regime. An
incompatible state will have high volumes of pending or outstanding
ICSID decisions against it, which renders ICSID’s enforcement and
execution mechanism ineffective. When that happens, it leaves a state
participating in the ICSID process without the intent or ability to honor
the outcome. It follows that incompatible states pose an obstacle to the
efficacy of ICSID-backed foreign direct investment because without a
mechanism that allows investors to effectively execute on the assets of an
15. Hals, supra note 13.
16. See, e.g., Melissa Daniels, Crystallex Urges DC Circ. To Uphold $1.2B Venezuela Award,
LAW 360 (Sept. 25, 2017), https://www.law360.com/articles/967262/crystallex-urges-dc-circ-touphold-1-2b-venezuela-award; Shayna Posses, Venezuela Again Urges DC Circ. To Nix OK of
$1.2B Award, LAW 360 (Oct. 30, 2017), https://www.law360.com/articles/979512/venezuelaagain-urges-dc-circ-to-nix-ok-of-1-2b-award; Christopher Crosby, Venezuela Says Mining Co.
Can’t Claim $1.4B In BNY Funds, LAW 360 (Oct. 17, 2017), https://www.law360
.com/articles/975393/venezuela-says-mining-co-can-t-claim-1-4b-in-bny-funds; Natalie Olivo,
Venezuelan Oil Co. Decries Bid For Stock In $1.2B Award Row, LAW 360 (Aug. 17, 2017),
https://www.law360.com/articles/955224/venezuelan-oil-co-decries-bid-for-stock-in-1-2b-awardrow.
17. Hals, supra note 13; see infra Part V.
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incompatible state, ICSID does not back up the investor. Therefore, while
ICSID provides the investor with an award, the investor is left on its own
to battle a sovereign in the United States legal system where sovereign
immunity and corporate law favor the sovereign over the investor, which
lowers the utility of the ICSID award.
This article is divided into five substantive parts. Part II will provide
background on the applicable law, establishment and development of
ICSID, and the use of bilateral treaties before it makes a comparison
between Argentina and Venezuela. Part III will provide an overview of
the expropriation and the resulting dispute in Crystallex v. Venezuela.
Part IV will provide information on the Award and the law governing the
registration, enforcement, and execution of an award in the United States.
Part V will explore the gap between what the ICSID dispute mechanism
should do and how it deals with incompatible states, such as Argentina
and Venezuela. Part VI will provide an update on the progress of the
dispute as of March 2019. Part VII concludes the note.
II. ICSID FACES AN UNANTICIPATED SET OF CHALLENGES TO ITS
EFFICACY OVER A HALF-CENTURY AFTER ITS FOUNDING
Part II will emphasize the vital role ICSID plays in backing foreign
direct investment and argue that Venezuela is dangerous to ICSID’s
efficacy. This Part will begin with the history of international investment.
It will provide background on the establishment and development of
ICSID and will include an overview of bilateral investment treaties. With
this foundation, we will see how ICSID’s solution worked until
Argentina’s actions following the Argentine financial crisis challenged
ICSID’s efficacy. Finally, this Part will compare Argentina’s situation
with the current situation in Venezuela and argue that Venezuela poses a
larger challenge to the ICSID system’s efficacy than Argentina did in the
2000s.
A. The Washington Convention Corrected a Misalignment of Incentives
Between States and Investors
Part II (A) provides an overview of the state of foreign direct
investment before the existence of international investor-state arbitration.
We will first identify the parties, the host state, the investor, and the
investor’s state. We will then look at each party’s incentives because their
incentives did not align before the establishment of the ICSID
Convention. After that, we will look at what each party gained, retained,
and conceded when it joined the ICSID system of alternative dispute
resolution. This section will show how foreign direct investment worked
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before the ICSID Convention and how it should work under the ICSID
Convention.
i. The Actors Involved in Foreign Investment Had Misaligned
Incentives Pre-ICSID
It is important to understand the actors and their incentives to
appreciate the problem that the drafters of the ICSID Convention wanted
to resolve. The first actor was the host state that sought private capital. In
the 1960s, many developing countries in Latin America, Asia, and Africa
sought to invest more capital than their populations saved. 18 And, while
these countries often “possessed a wealth of natural resources, such as
mineral deposits, many countries lacked the capital, technology or knowhow to exploit these resources.”19 The answer was foreign investment.20
Foreign investment involves “capital flows from one country to another,
granting extensive ownership stakes in domestic companies and assets”
and the investor will have “an active role in management of its
investment.”21 Yet, in a post-colonial world, the people of these countries
valued their state’s sovereignty and feared the lack of independence and
foreign exploitation that could result from foreign capital investment. 22
These fears were reflected in the terms offered by developing host states
to foreign investors in the period leading up to the ICSID Convention in
1965. The opportunities included terms lacking local legislative
protection and requiring disputes to be settled in the host state’s court.23
These terms provided the host state with leverage over the investor.
The second actor was the foreign investor. The foreign investors had
an entirely different set of incentives than the host state. Investors from
places such as the United States and Canada looked for investment

18. See KENNETH J. VANDEVELDE,
AND INTERPRETATION 11-14 (2010).

BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES: HISTORY, POLICY,

19. See IMF, Macroeconomic Policy Frameworks for Resource-Rich Developing Countries,
Policy Papers (Aug. 24, 2012), https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/Policy-Papers/Issues/2016
/12/31/Macroeconomic-Policy-Frameworks-for-Resource-Rich-Developing-Countries-PP4698
[hereinafter IMF, Macroeconomic Policy Frameworks for Resource Rich Developing Countries].
20. See INT’L BAR ASS’N, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, FOREIGN INVESTMENT AND THE LAW:
ISSUES OF PRIVATE SECTOR INVOLVEMENT, FOREIGN INVESTMENT AND THE RULE OF LAW IN A
NEW ERA 5 (Robert Pritchard ed. 1996) [hereinafter ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT FOREIGN
INVESTMENTS AND THE LAW].
21. See Foreign Investment, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/terms/f/foreigninvestment.asp (last visited Sept. 7, 2018).
22. See KENNETH J. VANDEVELDE, BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES: HISTORY, POLICY,
AND INTERPRETATION 11 (2010).
23. See id.
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opportunities abroad to increase diversification and total return.24
Individuals and companies investing abroad likely tolerated higher levels
of risk than domestic investors because they believed that certain foreign
markets carry an acceptable level of risk that was compensated by the risk
premium.25 The risks associated with foreign direct investment included
being subject to a foreign government’s legal system when resolving
investment disputes.26 By the 1960s, communism had spread across
Europe and to parts of Asia, which made regime change another risk
associated with foreign direct investment.27 Traditionally, investors
feared the seizure or expropriation of their foreign investments,28 and
socialist regime change likely compounded that fear.29 The increased risk
to a potential investment meant that investors demanded more legal
safeguards from a host state.30 Investors desired protection for their
investments.
The third actor was the investor’s state. The investor’s state often
engaged in diplomatic relations with the host state.31 When an investment
dispute arose between a host state and an investor that could not be
resolved amicably in the host state, the investor’s only recourse was to
urge its own state to act in the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”). 32
Arguably, the investor’s state had little interest in bringing an action that
would jeopardize its relationship with the other government for the sake
of an investor, which made the likelihood of action at the ICJ negligible.
Thus, the system was ineffective because the investors and the investor’s
state had conflicting interests in the treatment of the host state.

24. See Maurice Obstfeld & Alan M. Taylor, Globalization and Capital Markets, in
GLOBALIZATION IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 121 (Michael D. Bordo, Alan M. Taylor & Jeffrey
G. Williamson eds., 2003); Joseph Nguyen, The 3 Biggest Risks Faced by International Investors,
INVESTOPEDIA (May 7, 2018), https://www.investopedia.com/articles/basics/11/biggest-risksinternational-investing.asp; VANDEVELDE, supra note 22, at 11.
25. Nguyen, supra note 24.
26. See SURYA P. SUBEDI, INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW: RECONCILING POLICY AND
PRINCIPLE 30 (2d ed. 2012); DANIEL C.K. CHOW & THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL
BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS 358 (3rd ed. 2015).
27. See VANDEVELDE, supra note 22, at 42-43.
28. See CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, supra note 26, at 358.
29. See VANDEVELDE, supra note 22, at 42-43.
30. See SUBEDI, supra note 26, at 28.
31. See CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, supra note 26, at 358-62.
32. The International Court of Justice provided a forum for state-to-state disputes, which
included disputes where a host state wronged another state’s subject. Charity L. Goodman,
Uncharted Waters: Financial Crisis and Enforcement of ICSID Awards in Argentina, 28 U. PA. J.
INT’L ECON. L. 449 (2007).
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In sum, the three parties involved in foreign direct investment in the
1960s had misaligned incentives resulting from conflicting desires. The
host state wanted foreign investment on the condition that it could retain
jurisdiction over investment disputes and not cater to foreign investors in
its domestic law. The investor wanted access to investment opportunities
available only in developing countries but with some legal safeguards for
the investment, such as a fair forum for dispute resolution. Finally, the
investor’s state served as a reluctant advocate for wronged investors at
the ICJ. The fact that the investor’s state operates to serve the interests of
the nation rather than the interests of an individual investor makes the ICJ
an unsuitable forum for investment dispute resolution. The parties needed
an alternative forum that would align the incentives of the parties while
requiring concessions from all of them.
ii. The World Bank Created the ICSID as a Solution to Align the
Parties’ Incentives to Benefit All Involved in Foreign Investment
The ICSID Convention cured the misalignment of incentives
between states and investors by creating a neutral forum for dispute
resolution. The next few paragraphs will highlight what each party
gained, retained, or lost by participating in the ICSID system.
The World Bank solved the problem by creating a “neutral forum”
where investors could bring investment disputes against a host country. 33
The World Bank sponsored a multilateral treaty known as the ICSID
Convention or Washington Convention.34 The sponsors believed that,
“the provision of a mechanism for the settlement of investment disputes
would promote the flow of foreign investment into developing countries
and thereby promote economic development.”35 The ICSID Treaty
established the rules and a mechanism to achieve these ends, with the
International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (“ICSID”)
functioning as the mechanism.36 ICSID should be seen as the World
Bank’s solution to the issues of international investment described above.
This solution required give-and-take from each party and produced an
alternative forum for investor-state arbitration.
The investor gained access to a neutral forum that did not rely on
the existing domestic legal system. This forum elevated investors to

33. See MARGARET L. MOSES, THE PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 231 (2nd ed. 2012).
34. Id.
35. M. SORNARAJAH, THE SETTLEMENT OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT DISPUTES 164 (2000).
36. See MOSES, supra note 33, at 231.
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actors at the international level.37 Before, international law did not
recognize individual investors before ICSID gave them a platform.38
ICSID likely lowered the investor’s risk of expropriation or unfair
treatment without recourse because investors could compel arbitration at
ICSID. An investor awarded compensation for unfair treatment or
expropriation could enforce its award in any contracting state.39 Thus, this
neutral forum generated investor confidence by lowering an investor’s
risk of expropriation without compensation and by minimizing unfair
treatment towards the investor by the host state.40 The investors retained
the risk of expropriation with compensation and faced the difficulty of
bringing a sovereign to task, which are risks explored later.41
Furthermore, investors lost any immunity that came from not being an
international actor. As an international actor, the investor could be
brought to arbitration by the host country for breaching its obligations to
the host country.42
The host state gained access to foreign direct investment. Foreign
investment brings capital, technology, and other know-how to developing
countries.43 As an ICSID member state privy to this inflow of foreign
investment, the host state gained a competitive advantage on its
neighbors.44 To the early adopters of the ICSID Convention, ICSID gave
a developing country a leg up over competition without requiring the
country to drastically alter its legal or political system to cater to foreign

37. SORNARAJAH, supra note 35, at 165.
38. Id.
39. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of
Other States art. 54, opened for signature Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, 575 U.N.T.S. 159,
[hereinafter ICSID Convention] (entered into force Oct. 14, 1966)
40. SUBEDI, supra note 26, at 30.
41. See infra Parts V-VI.
42. ICSID Convention, supra note 39, art. 36.
43. See Kimberly Amadeo, Foreign Direct Investment, Its Pros, Cons and Importance to You,
BALANCE (Jan. 15, 2018), https://www.thebalance.com/foreign-direct-investment-fdi-pros-consand-importance-3306283.
44. You should consider the marketplace for foreign direct investment to understand why a
developing country would become a contracting party to the ICSID Convention. As mentioned
above, many developing countries required foreign capital to overcome a deficiency in national
savings. Economics 101 tells us the following: when these countries entered the global market, they
became competing suppliers of investment opportunities. Between two similarly-situated suppliers,
the country that allowed an investor to bypass its legal system opting for a neutral forum for
investment disputes provided the more attractive business opportunity. To the early adopters of the
ICSID Convention, ICSID gave a developing country a leg up over competitors without requiring
the country to drastically alter its legal or political system to cater to foreign investors. Thus, ICSID
gave some developing states a competitive advantage, which eventually would turn into something
that was necessary for a state to do to compete in the marketplace.
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investors.45 The host state retained its ability to expropriate for a public
purpose in exchange for compensation.46
By opting into the alternative forum for investors, the host state
retained its sovereignty in a few senses. First, the host state retained
control of its domestic legal system. Second, the host state’s legislators
did not need to cater to foreign investors in its domestic law. Third, the
host state retained its sovereign immunity when courts of contracting
states executed ICSID awards against the host state’s foreign held
assets.47 The host state conceded its control over foreign investors’
disputes,48 and—without that control—its ability to expropriate foreign
investments with impunity. However, if developing countries offered a
potential investor an alternative to their own legal systems, investors
would be “encouraged to invest in such states.”49 The improved
“investment climate” in the state benefited both the host country and
investor.50
The investor’s state also would become a contracting party to the
ICSID Convention. It can be argued that the state gained neutrality
because it no longer needed to pick a side in a dispute between an investor
and another state. The state would retain its freedom to focus on its own
foreign policy interests rather than acting as the investor’s champion at
the ICJ. Yet, as a contracting party to ICSID, the investor’s state
conceded some of its control over who could bring an ICSID award to its
courts. The investor’s state lost control because the ICSID convention
requires contracting parties to “recognize” and “enforce” ICSID awards
against investors or states as if they were final judgments in the domestic
legal system.51
iii. The Result is the Modern ICSID System
The ICSID Convention established an “independent, depoliticized
and effective dispute-settlement institution.”52 The organization provides
parties with the means of settling disputes through arbitration or fact-

45. See generally VANDEVELDE, supra note 22.
46. Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Venezuela and the Government
of Canada for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, Can.-Venez., art. V, July 1, 1996, 2221
U.N.T.S. 1 [hereinafter Can.-Venez. BIT] (entered into force Jan. 28, 1998).
47. See infra Part V.
48. See infra Part II. B.
49. SUBEDI, supra note 26, at 30.
50. See JESWALD W. SALACUSE, THE LAW OF INVESTMENT TREATIES 102 (2d ed. 2015).
51. ICSID Convention, supra note 39, art. 54.
52. About ICSID, ICSID, https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/about/default.aspx (last visited
Sept. 8, 2018).
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finding based out of the World Bank in Washington D.C.53 Every dispute
is brought before an independent “Arbitration Tribunal” that will allow
each side to present evidence and put forward legal arguments to inform
the Tribunal’s decision.54 A 2017 study by the law firm Allen & Overy
found the average arbitration row (ICSID and other arbitration panels)
lasts 4 years.55 And the average ICSID Tribunal costs exceed 920,000
USD, when including “arbitrators’ fees,” “expenses” and “institutional
charges.”56 On average, a party spends 6,019,000 USD on legal fees to
bring or 4,855,000 USD to defend against an investor-state row.57 This
sum included money spent on attorney’s fees, experts, and witnesses. 58
For a wronged investor or state, this system has traditionally been worth
the cost because it provides a forum to resolve disputes in front of a
neutral body and the finality of a binding judgment enforceable in any
ICSID contracting state.
B. States Use Bilateral Treaties and ICSID to Encourage Foreign
Direct Investment Between Equally Eager Investors and Developing
Nations
Part II (B) will explain that investment treaties compliment the
ICSID solution. After the World Bank established the ICSID forum,
individual contracting states needed to establish investment treaties
among themselves that would generate the substantive law and select
ICSID as the forum for future investor-state disputes. The first section
will highlight the rise in the use of bilateral investment treaties (“BITs”)
in tandem with ICSID. The next section will highlight the CanadaVenezuela BIT that provides the substantive law and a forum selection
clause for the Crystallex row. With the guarantees that Venezuela
afforded Canadian investors in mind, the reader will be equipped to
appraise Crystallex’s claims of “expropriation without compensation”
and a breach of the promise of “fair and equitable treatment” (“FET”).

53. See About ICSID, supra note 52; Contacts—Headquarters, WORLD BANK,
http://www.worldbank.org/en/about/contacts (last visited Sept. 26, 2018).
54. See About ICSID, supra note 52.
55. Matthew Hodgson & Alastair Campbell, Investment Treaty Arbitration: cost, duration
and size of claims all show steady increase, ALLEN & OVERY: PUBLICATIONS (Dec. 14, 2017),
http://www.allenovery.com/publications/en-gb/Pages/Investment-Treaty-Arbitration-costduration-and-size-of-claims-all-show-steady-increase.aspx.
56. Hodgson & Campbell, supra note 55.
57. Id.
58. Id.
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i. The Rise of Bilateral Investment Treaties Made ICSID Popular
BITs elevated ICSID to relevancy in the 1990s. 59 BITs gave ICSID
jurisdiction over hundreds of investor-state contractual relationships.60
The ICSID project began to gain momentum as the proliferation of bilateral and multi-lateral investment treaties between developed and
developing countries encouraged investment in the latter countries.61 As
of 2017, there were over 2,300 BITs in force.62 Of all the cases registered
at ICSID, BITs provided ICSID jurisdiction in 59.8% of the disputes.63
One hundred sixty-two nations have signed on as contracting parties to
the ICSID convention.64 In fact, the number of disputes registered with
ICSID varied from none to four per year in the 1970s through the early
1980s before increasing and taking off in the late-1980s and 1990s.65
ICSID hosted an average of forty-two disputes per year in the 2010s.66
These facts suggest that BITs worked to promote investors’ access to
ICSID, and increased the popularity of ICSID investor-state arbitration.
The substantive law that the ICSID Tribunal employs comes from a
BIT. The substance of BITs deal “exclusively with foreign investment”
and seek “to create an international legal framework to govern
investments by the nationals of one country in the territory of another.”67
A BIT will likely be a single document.68 Finally, each BIT follows a
similar framework and shares key provisions. 69
ii. The Can.-Venez. BIT Provides the Substantive Law and Forum for
the Crystallex Row
The Canada-Venezuela BIT of 1996 that features in the Crystallex
v. Venezuela dispute resembles a prototypical BIT. The following articles
59. SORNARAJAH, supra note 35, at 167-68.
60. See id. at 168; International Investment Agreements Navigator, UNCTAD: INV. POL’Y
HUB, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA (last visited Dec. 21, 2017); International Centre
for Settlement of Investment Disputes [ICSID], The ICSID Caseload-Statistics, Issue 2017-1
(2017), https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Documents/resources/ICSID%20Web%20Stats%2020171%20(English)%20Final.pdf (last visited Dec. 21, 2017) [hereinafter ICSID 2017-1 CaseloadStatistics].
61. See SORNARAJAH, supra note 35, at 167; ICSID 2017-1 Caseload Statistics, supra note
60, at 18.
62. International Investment Agreements Navigator, supra note 60.
63. ICSID 2017-1 Caseload Statistics, supra note 60, at 18.
64. Database of ICSID Member States, ICSID, https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages
/about/Database-of-Member-States.aspx (last visited Sept. 8, 2018).
65. ICSID 2017-1 Caseload Statistics, supra note 60, at 18.
66. Id.
67. See SALACUSE, supra note 50, at 100.
68. See id. at 141.
69. See id.
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provide the relevant points of procedural and substantive law relevant to
foreign investors in Venezuela. The articles also generate the causes of
action available to those investors and submit the parties to jurisdiction
at ICSID. By reading the following articles of the Canadian-Venezuelan
dispute you will understand the blackletter law applicable to Crystallex’s
dispute and appreciate the substance of a prototypical investment treaty.
Article I of the treaty puts forward key definitions about
investment.70 Article 1(f) defines investment as, “any kind of asset owned
or controlled by an investor of one Contracting Party either directly or
indirectly, including through an investor of a third state, in the territory
of the other Contracting Party in accordance with the latter’s laws.”71
Investment includes “(i) movable and immovable property and any
related property rights . . . (vi) rights, conferred by law or under contract,
to undertake any economic and commercial activity, including any rights
to search for, cultivate, extract or exploit natural resources.”72 The
definition of investment is important for subject matter jurisdiction under
ICSID. The organization is a center for investment disputes only.73
Similarly, the parties stipulated as to who counts as an investor.74 Investor
means “any natural person possessing the citizenship of Canada in
accordance with its laws; or any enterprise incorporated or duly
constituted in accordance with applicable laws of Canada, who makes the
investment in the territory of Venezuela.”75 As a result, how the parties
define investment dictates which types of enterprises will be protected by
the BIT and granted an alternative dispute resolution forum.
Article II and Article VII make certain guarantees about the
establishment, acquisition, and protection of a foreign investment.76 The
host country makes two guarantees about the investments of the other
state, guaranteeing “fair and equitable treatment” and full “protection and
security.”77 These causes of action are featured in the Crystallex dispute.
Article V deals with expropriation.78 Investments of foreign
investors “shall not be nationalized, expropriated or subjected to
measures having an effect equivalent to nationalization or
expropriation.”79 If the country does expropriate the investment, certain
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

Can.-Venez. BIT, supra note 46, art. I.
Id.
Id.
See generally id.
Id.
Id.
Id. arts. II, V, VII.
Id.
Id. art. V.
Id.

WESSON (FINAL_FOR_JCI)

2019]

10/28/2019 2:15 PM

Venezuela Undermines Crystallex

159

procedural safeguards regulate expropriation.80 The expropriation must
be for a “public purpose.”81 The decision to expropriate that investment
must be made in a “nondiscriminatory manner” and by “due process of
law.”82 Crucially, the investors must be granted “adequate and effective
compensation.”83 The value of compensation shall be based on the
genuine value of the investment immediately before the expropriation or
at the time the proposed expropriation became public knowledge.84 The
compensation and interest will be paid “without delay” after the
expropriation.85 We will see that adequate compensation without delay
forms the crux of the Crystallex dispute.
Article XII addresses the settlement of disputes between an investor
and the host state and provides the forum selection clause.86 First, the
parties will attempt to settle the dispute amicably between themselves. 87
If that cannot happen, then the dispute may be submitted by the investor
to arbitration.88 Article XII(4) provides that the dispute may be submitted
to arbitration at ICSID if both states are contracting parties to the ICSID
convention.89 Venezuela and Canada are both contracting parties to
ICSID.90
Article XII (9) sets out the award.91 The award can be monetary
damages and interest or restitution of property, or both.92 The contracting
party can opt for damages instead of specific performance.93 We will see
that claimants prefer monetary damages over restitution, especially when
the investment climate in the country changes. Article XII (10) proclaims
the award of arbitration shall be final and binding, which mirrors the
language in Article 54 of the ICSID Convention.94

80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. arts. V, VII.
83. Id.
84. See id.
85. Id.
86. Id. art. XII.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. See id.
90. ICSID, List of Contracting States and Other Signatories of the Convention, WORLD BANK
(Aug. 27, 2018), https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Documents/icsiddocs/List%20of%20Contra
cting%20States%20and%20Other%20Signatories%20of%20the%20Convention%20-%20
Latest.pdf [hereinafter ICSID, List of Contracting States].
91. Can.-Venez. BIT, supra note 46, art. XII.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. See infra Part IV.
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C. The 2001 Financial Crisis Created Unanticipated Challenges for
ICSID Dispute Resolution When Argentina Undermined an Assumption
of the ICSID Convention
The following paragraphs detail a brief history of Argentina and
provide a foil for a later discussion of modern Venezuela. Argentina
existed as a member of the international investment community before its
economy crashed in 2001.95 This section will highlight how Argentina
responded to various ICSID claimants during its economic crisis and in
the years following the crisis. Argentina’s simultaneous participation in
ICSID disputes and criticism of the system left investors in an odd place.
An investor that brought a claim at ICSID expected a tough fight because
Argentina would use every procedural and substantive challenge to
defend and delay against a finding for the investor. However, once the
tribunal granted the investor an award, Argentina would cease to
participate in the process. The result was a decline in investors’
confidence in Argentina, and arguably even a decline in investors’
confidence in ICSID itself. The problem of Argentina complying with
ICSID disputes while choosing not to pay out on awards posed a novel
issue for investors.
i. A Brief History of Argentina’s Economic and Global Affairs
Argentina opened itself up to foreign investment in the 1990s and
Argentina’s president began to privatize entire industries, including the
public utilities sectors.96 For example, the government signed an
Argentina-United States BIT.97 Argentina’s free trade policies resulted in
an inflow of foreign capital into the Argentine economy. 98 Yet, the
globalization of Argentina’s domestic markets was cut short by a
financial crisis.
In 2001, Argentina’s economy collapsed.99 In the decade before the
crash, the Argentine government had been borrowing heavily from
foreign sources.100 Foreign debt totaled approximately 140,000,000,000

95. See Argentina- United States of America BIT (1991), UNCTAD: INV. POL’Y HUB,
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/mostRecent/treaty/162 (last visited Sept. 8, 2018).
96. A decline without parallel, THE ECONOMIST (Feb. 28, 2002), https://www.economist
.com/node/1010911.
97. Argentina- United States of America BIT, supra note 95.
98. A decline without parallel, supra note 96.
99. GUS VAN HARTEN, INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION AND PUBLIC LAW 1 (2007).
100. Argentina Total External Debt, TRADING ECON., https://tradingeconomics.com/
argentina/external-debt (last visited Sept. 8, 2018).
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USD by the end of 2001.101 At the same time, Argentina had pegged its
peso to the US Dollar.102 This practice, however, was unsustainable and
Argentinians knew that the one to one ratio would not last forever.103 And
so Argentinians rushed to their banks to exchange their pesos for
dollars.104 The bank run led to protests.105 The protests led to political
resignations.106 And, the political instability plunged Argentina further
into economic and social crisis.107 Gross domestic product (GDP) per
capita dropped by nearly 20%, leaving 55% of Argentinians in poverty. 108
The change in the economy left Argentina insolvent and in crisis.
ii. Foreign Investors Row With Argentina at ICSID
The Argentine crisis presented a challenge not only to Argentina’s
creditors but also to foreign investors. Any foreign investor would have
initiated arbitration proceedings, hoping to recover but knowing that
Argentina had defaulted on over 140,000,000,000 USD of public debt.109
Yet, wronged investors still sought enforcement through ICSID
arbitration.
Argentina denounced claims and mounted defenses in ICSID. 110 In
the aftermath of the crisis, Argentina rowed with wronged investors in
ICSID tribunals. Argentina denounced the actions of the investors and
ICSID while it participated in tribunals.111 Argentina, as the respondent,
sought to complicate recovery throughout the arbitration process through
a tactic of denying and delaying the process.112 This tactic made any
investor’s dispute with Argentina expensive, long, and uncertain.113
Argentina would comply with ICSID proceedings while utilizing
procedural grounds to challenge awards.114 As Charity Goodman aptly
101. See Iris van de Wiel, The Argentine Crisis 2001/2002, RABOBANK (2013),
https://economics.rabobank.com/publications/2013/august/the-argentine-crisis-20012002-/.
102. HARTEN, supra note 99, at 1.
103. Wiel, supra note 101.
104. See id.
105. See id.
106. Chronology: Argentina’s turbulent history of economic crises, REUTERS (July 30, 2014,
10:55AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-argentina-debt-chronology/chronology-argentinasturbulent-history-of-economic-crises-idUSKBN0FZ23N20140730.
107. Chronology: Argentina’s turbulent history of economic crises, supra note 106.
108. Miguel Kiguel, Argentina’s 2001 Economic and Financial Crisis: Lessons for Europe, in
THINK TANK 20: BEYOND MACROECONOMIC COORDINATION DISCUSSIONS IN THE G-20 7 (2011),
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/11_think_tank_20.pdf.
109. A decline without parallel, supra note 96.
110. See Goodman, supra note 32, at 449.
111. See id. at 479.
112. See Goodman, supra note 32, at 480.
113. See generally id.
114. Id. at 449.
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pointed out in a 2007 comment, Argentinian officials publicly
condemned the notion of paying foreign investors during a time of
economic crisis.115 Yet, Goodman stated, “Argentina has indicated it will
honor the Convention and use the narrow procedural grounds available
to it to challenge these awards.”116 In effect, it postponed payment on the
awards.117 Furthermore, while Articles 53 and 54 of the ICSID
Convention call for contracting states to recognize and enforce ICSID
awards as final, Argentina officials claimed a right to review awards in
its own court system “if they disturb public order.”118 This action would
deprive the investor of the neutrality and the finality guaranteed by
ICSID. These delay tactics proved costly to investor claimants trying to
collect from Argentina.
Investor confidence in Argentina and ICSID is lower than before the
crisis. On Argentina’s post-crisis posture, Goodman stated that
“Argentina is left balancing immediate issues of societal welfare with
longer issues of shoring up foreign investor confidence in Argentina. It is
not remotely settled which interest will win out.”119 Ten years on, we
know that Argentina prioritized societal welfare. The Argentine economy
has been growing at an average rate of 8% per year since the crisis.120
However, these crucial gains came at the cost of Argentina’s international
reputation because Argentina failed to fulfil its obligations to its creditors
and ICSID claimants. Today, “Argentina has remained cut off from
foreign capital markets and is considered a pariah by most investors.” 121
Yet, Argentina did not disaffirm the ICSID treaty. 122 The fact that
Argentina has been cut off from international capital markets has very
likely stunted the country’s rising GDP.
iii. Argentina Thwarted Claimants and Defied ICSID
In summary, 1990s Argentina encouraged the privatization of many
industries and sought to encourage foreign direct investment in the
Argentine economy. Argentina became a party to ICSID and numerous
investment treaties that selected ICSID as its forum. In the early 2000s,
Argentina’s economy collapsed, and the country became insolvent soon
115. See id. at 479.
116. Id. at 480.
117. Id.
118. ICSID Convention, supra note 39, arts. 53-54; Goodman, supra note 32, at 469.
119. Goodman, supra note 32, at 481.
120. Kiguel, supra note 108, at 7.
121. Chronology: Argentina’s turbulent history of economic crises, supra note 106.
122. Database of ICSID Member States, ICSID, https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/about
/Database-of-Member-States.aspx (last visited Sept. 8, 2018).
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after. Foreign investors subject to the BITs filed claims through ICSID,
which Argentina denounced as against the public interest and resisted at
ICSID. Argentina then delayed payment on awards rendered against it by
ICSID tribunals. This legal tactic eroded investor confidence in Argentina
even though Argentina remained a party to ICSID and participated in
disputes up until the award. Because investors lost confidence in
Argentina, a contracting party to ICSID, it reflected poorly on the ICSID
system, a system itself created to protect an investor’s expectation of a
neutral forum where they could dispute with states and be compensated
by those states when they deserve it.
iv. How Argentina Undermined Key Assumptions of the ICSID
Convention and What Argentina Can Tell Us About Venezuela Today
Argentina is important here for two reasons. First, the Argentine
Crisis created unanticipated challenges for ICSID dispute resolution
because Argentina undermined a fundamental premise upon which the
ICSID Convention functioned. Argentina’s response to the ICSID claims
after the Argentine Crisis undermined the notion that a contracting state
would honor awards rendered against it. Argentina’s inability and
unwillingness to honor awards rendered against it undermined the
assumption that ICSID provided investments adequate protection from
actions of the host state. Furthermore, Argentina demonstrated an
effective defense strategy within the parameters of the ICSID rules,
which thwarted claimants’ expectations by delaying any payment on
some awards and settling other awards.
Second, Argentina provides an interesting comparison to Venezuela
today. As of this writing, Venezuela’s claimants and creditors face many
of the same challenges that Argentina’s creditors faced in the 2000s.
Venezuela is teetering in bankruptcy and has many foreign creditors and
claimants at ICSID.123 And, by the looks of it, Venezuela is using
Argentina’s ICSID playbook by actively delaying and challenging
claimants at ICSID. Yet, in many ways, Venezuela presents a bigger
challenge to its claimants and to ICSID than Argentina did before it.
Therefore, Venezuela is not another Argentina. Instead, Venezuela is a
tougher adversary to wronged investors, and it is currently incompatible
with the ICSID system.
123. Javier Ferrero, Venezuela versus the ICSID Convention, GLOBAL ARB. NEWS (Feb. 24,
2015), https://globalarbitrationnews.com/venezuela-versus-icsid-convention-20120422/; How
Long Can Venezuela Avoid Default, THE ECONOMIST (Nov. 4, 2017), https://www.economist.com
/news/americas/21730895-south-americas-insolvent-left-wing-champion-has-been-starsovereign-bond-markets-how-long.
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D. Venezuela: The Rise of an Incompatible State
This portion is about Venezuela and its rise as a state incompatible
with ICSID. The first three paragraphs show how Venezuela flipped from
embracing ICSID and foreign investment to rejecting them. This section
will provide a history of Venezuela’s political, economic, and foreign
policy in three snapshots: the 1990s, the 2000s, and the 2010s.
Venezuela’s transformation illustrates why Venezuela, like Argentina,
will likely ruin investor’s expectations at ICSID.124 Like Argentina in the
2000s, Venezuela is nearly insolvent and has adopted Argentina’s
litigation strategy of delaying or challenging awards, which makes
arbitration costly, lengthy, and uncertain for potential creditors.125
Furthermore, Venezuela poses a greater chance of thwarting investor’s
expectations at ICSID than Argentina because its government does not
care about the international investment system and because it benefits
from participating in ICSID disputes to protect the foreign assets of its
state-owned oil enterprises’ foreign assets.126 For these reasons, the
ICSID system will likely fail to deliver the compensation investors expect
from Venezuela because the government is making itself incompatible
with ICSID.
i. Venezuela in the 1990s: Globalization Under Andrés Pérez
First, it is important to look at the Venezuela that joined ICSID and
the globalization movement in the 1990s. In the 1990s, Venezuela
operated under a democratic style of government.127 Carlos Andrés Peréz
of the left-leaning Democratic Action Party held the Presidency.128 While
a democracy, Venezuelans experienced a chaotic political and economic
situation in the 1990s.129 President Peréz dealt with an economic
downturn and fought off two coup attempts by Colonel Hugo Chávez
during his presidency.130 Yet, President Peréz’s government eagerly
participated at the international level and showed a willingness to
embrace globalization.131 The government borrowed money from the
124. How Long Can Venezuela Avoid Default, supra note 123.
125. See id.
126. Ferrero, supra note 123.
127. Venezuela profile - Timeline, BBC (Nov. 1, 2017), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latinamerica-19652436.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. See ICSID, List of Contracting States, supra note 90; Paul Lewis, Venezuela Gets Big
I.M.F. Credit, Backing Market Reforms, NY TIMES, (July 13, 1996) http://www.nytimes.com—
/1996/07/13/world/venezuela-gets-big-imf-credit-backing-market-reforms.html;
Canada-
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International Monetary Fund during its economic downturn in the early
1990s.132 The Venezuelan government joined the ICSID Convention in
1993.133 And, in 1996, the government would sign the Canada-Venezuela
Bilateral Investment Treaty.134 These three actions reflected the
Venezuelan government’s willingness to embrace international
institutions and globalization. And so, the Venezuela that joined the
international investment community embraced globalization, perhaps to
remedy its domestic economic and political instability. This instability
did not make Venezuela unsuitable for international investment. The
ICSID system was created to provide stability for foreign investors within
a host state.135 Investors willing to enter the Venezuelan economy could
bypass the local legal system and arbitrate with Venezuela at ICSID. 136
And, as an active participant in the international community, investors
likely believed that Venezuela would cooperate at ICSID proceedings
because 1990s Venezuela embraced foreign direct investment and ICSID
as a solution to its economic instability.
ii. Venezuela in The 2000s: Socialism Under Chávez
Next, it is important to look at Venezuela under Hugo Chávez. The
Venezuelan people elected Hugo Chávez in 1998.137 President Chávez led
the “Bolivarian Revolution,” a “socialist political program,” under the
banner of the United Socialist Party of Venezuela (the “PVSU”).138 The
PVSU altered Venezuela’s democratic system of government by
changing the constitution and by passing an enabling law in 2000.139 With
this power, President Chávez worked to end corruption and to increase
spending on social programs.140 He financed the latter by tapping into the
state-run oil company to fund his spending on healthcare, subsidized

Venezuela, Bolivarian Republic of BIT (1996), UNCTAD: INV. POL’Y HUB, http://investment
policyhub.unctad.org/IIA/mostRecent/treaty/809 (last visited Sept. 8, 2018).
132. Lewis, supra note 131.
133. See Sergey Ripinsky, Venezuela’s Withdrawal From ICSID: What it Does and Does Not
Achieve, IISD: INV. TREATY NEWS (Apr. 13, 2012), https://www.iisd.org/itn/2012/04/13
/venezuelas-withdrawal-from-icsid-what-it-does-and-does-not-achieve/.
134. See Can.-Venez. BIT, supra note 46.
135. See generally SUBEDI, supra note 26, at 30.
136. See id.
137. Timeline: Venezuela’s tumultuous history, ALJAZEERA (Apr. 3, 2013),
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2012/09/201292121430533264.html.
138. See Brian A. Nelson, Hugo Chávez: President of Venezuela, ENCYCLOPEDIA
BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/biography/Hugo-Chávez (last updated July. 24, 2018).
139. See Nelson, supra note 138.
140. See id.
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food, and education.141 The high prices of oil in the mid-2000s meant that
the oil-producing country could divert its oil profits into these expensive
social programs without issue.142 After his re-election in 2006, President
Chávez began to nationalize entire industries, and, by the time of his
death in 2013, the government had nationalized much of its agriculture,
oil, and gold industries.143 Venezuela’s status as a party to ICSID and a
party to many bilateral investment treaties failed to deter Chávez’s regime
from expropriating foreign investments.144 Yet, the ill-effects of Chávez’s
meddling in the operation of the state-owned oil company and the
nationalization of many private businesses were not immediate. Instead,
Venezuelans enjoyed an increase in the standard of living during
Chávez’s tenure from 1998–2013.145 At the international level, Chávez’s
government publicly contemplated pulling out of ICSID because of the
mounting number of claims resulting from Chávez’s expropriations of
whole industries.146 Under Chávez, Venezuela transformed from a willing
participant in economic globalization to a government that nationalized
many of its big industries.147 This Venezuela represented the sort of
sovereign against which the ICSID system was designed to combat by
protecting investments against expropriation and biased adjudication.148
But Venezuela would transform once again under President Maduro in
present times.
iii. Venezuela in Present Times: Authoritarianism Under Maduro
Venezuela under President Maduro is not a democracy. President
Chávez chose Maduro as his successor in 2013.149 Since then, Maduro’s

141. See id.; MARK WEISBROT & LUIS SANDOVAL, CTR. FOR ECON. & POLICY RESEARCH,
THE VENEZUELAN ECONOMY IN THE CHÁVEZ YEARS 2 (2007), cepr.net/document
s/publications/venezuela_2007_07.pdf.
142. See WEISBROT & SANDOVAL, supra note 141, at 2; Historical Crude Oil Prices and Price
Chart, INVESTMENT MINE, http://www.infomine.com/investment/metal-prices/crude-oil/all/ (last
visited Jan. 20, 2018).
143. See Nelson, supra note 138; Factbox: Venezuela’s nationalizations under Chávez,
REUTERS (Oct. 7, 2012), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-venezuela-election-nationalizations
/factbox-venezuelas-nationalizations-under-chávez-idUSBRE89701X20121008.
144. See José de Córdoba, Chávez Takes Steps to Exit Global Forum, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 13,
2011), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424053111903285704576560760106674594?mod=
googlenews_wsj.
145. See Charlie Devereux & Raymond Colitt, Venezuelans’ Quality of Life Improved in UN
Index Under Chavez, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 6, 2013), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles
/2013-03-07/venezuelans-quality-of-life-improved-in-un-index-under-chavez.
146. De Córdoba, supra note 144.
147. See Factbox: Venezuela’s nationalizations under Chávez, supra note 143.
148. See SUBEDI, supra note 26, at 30-32.
149. See Venezuela Profile-Timeline, supra note 127.
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party, the PVSU, has controlled all branches of government.150 President
Maduro and the party continue to follow Chávez’s nationalistic and social
policies.151 These policies have stifled the free market.152 Without
capitalism, Venezuela continues to rely on its oil exports as its chief
source of income;153 oil exports have consistently counted for almost all
of Venezuela’s exports and nearly half of the government’s revenue.154
This reliance became an issue when oil prices dropped over 40% in
2014.155 Additionally, the state owned oil company, Petróleos de
Venezuela, S.A. (“PDVSA”), has become less efficient at producing oil
since the government under Chávez took control of its operations. 156
Taken together, the drastic drop in revenue from oil exports has left the
Venezuelan economy in shambles;157 since 2014, the Venezuelan
economy has been in recession.158
Compared to 2000s Argentina, Venezuela is much worse off. The
Economist recently cited three university studies estimating that 82% of
Venezuelan households live in poverty compared to 48% in 1998 before

150. See Michael McCarthy, 6 things you need to know about Venezuela’s political and
economic crisis, WASH. POST (May 18, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkeycage/wp/2016/05/18/6-things-you-need-to-know-about-venezuelas-political-and-economiccrisis/?utm_term=.a46f2978a8ef; Zeeshan Aleem, How Venezuela went from a rich democracy to
a dictatorship on the brink of collapse, VOX (Sept. 19, 2017), https://www.vox.com/world
/2017/9/19/16189742/venezuela-maduro-dictator-chavez-collapse.
151. See Siddhartha Mahanta, How Much Longer Can Venezuela Go On Like This?, THE
ATLANTIC (Oct. 29, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2016/10/venezuelamaduro-chavez-protest-caracas/505874/.
152. 2017 Index of Economic Freedom: Venezuela, HERITAGE, https://www.heritage.org
/index/country/venezuela (last visited Sept. 8, 2018); Venezuela: Foreign Investment, SANTANDER:
TRADEPORTAL, https://en.portal.santandertrade.com/establish-overseas/venezuela/investing (last
visited Sept. 8, 2018).
153. See McCarthy, supra note 150.
154. See The World Factbook: Venezuela, CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY [CIA],
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ve.html (last visited Feb. 10,
2018).
155. See Why the oil price is falling, THE ECONOMIST (Dec. 8, 2014), https://www.economist
.com/blogs/economist-explains/2014/12/economist-explains-4.
156. See Lucia Kassai & Sheela Tobben, Venezuelan Oil Output Heads to 29-Year Low,
BLOOMBERG (Nov. 10, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-11-10/venezuelanoil-output-heads-to-29-year-low-as-cash-crunch-grows.
157. See id.
158. See Dep’t for Int’l Trade, Doing Business in Venezuela: Venezuela trade and export guide,
GOV.UK,
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/exporting-to-venezuela/exporting-tovenezuela (last updated Oct. 20, 2017) [hereinafter U.K Dep’t for Int’l Trade, Doing business in
Venezuela].
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Chávez.159 “Venezuela’s GDP in 2017 is 35% below 2013 levels.”160
Essentially, present day Venezuela is poorer and less accountable than
the Venezuela of the 1990s or 2000s.
iv. Venezuela is Incompatible With ICSID
Venezuela is in a unique position from an international standpoint.
The government has denounced the international investment system and
ICSID.161 It has repatriated much of its foreign reserves.162 Now, the
government stands to default on its sovereign debt,163 and its potential
liabilities to ICSID claimants number in the billions of dollars.164 One
would think that the government would recede from the international
system. Yet, Venezuela is a member of the Organization of the Petroleum
Exporting Countries (“OPEC”).165 As a result, Venezuela’s state-owned
oil company, PDVSA, cannot operate without having assets abroad.166 So,
while the Venezuelan government denounced the ICSID convention in
2012,167 it continues to participate at ICSID, perhaps for fear of claimants
executing on its oil company’s foreign assets.168 This reality forces the
Venezuelan government to actively participate in the ICSID system; a
system that the country’s government openly denounces.169 The result is
a government that has an incentive to participate in ICSID disputes to
159. See Will Venezuela’s dictatorship survive?, THE ECONOMIST (Mar. 9. 2017),
https://www.economist.com/news/americas/21718572-how-steal-country-will-venezuelasdictatorship-survive.
160. See Ricardo Hausmann, Venezuela’s economic decline is sharper than the US Great
Depression, WORLD ECON. F. (July 31, 2017), https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2017/07
/venezuela-s-economic-decline-is-sharper-than-the-us-great-depression.
161. See Ripinsky, supra note 133.
162. See As Emerging Markets Currencies Collapse, Gold is Being Mobilized,
BᴜʟʟɪᴏɴSᴛᴀʀ.ᴄᴏᴍ,
https://www.bullionstar.com/blogs/ronan-manly/tag/banco-central-de-vene
zuela/ (last visited Sept. 26, 2018).
163. See John Paul Rathbone & Robin Wigglesworth, Venezuela slips deeper into crisis after
default, FIN. TIMES (Nov. 14, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/7f066afc-c8cf-11e7-ab187a9fb7d6163e.
164. See ALBERTO J. ROJAS & JUAN LORENZO MALDONADO, CREDIT SUISSE, VENEZUELA:
ICSID CASES, A POTENTIAL RISK ON THE HORIZON 1 (2015), https://research-doc.creditsuisse.com/docView?language=ENG&format=PDF&source_id=csplusresearchcp&document_id
=1051398411&serialid=jhnSujb3ggfXbmTG1%2BBuJRKjsiaPuPMomPDIV0D6JOA%3D.
165. See OPEC: Member Countries, ORG. PETROLEUM EXPORTING COUNTRIES [OPEC],
http://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/about_us/25.htm (last visited Sept. 8, 2018).
166. See Venezuela asks its creditors to renegotiate its vast debt, THE ECONOMIST (Nov. 3,
2017), https://www.economist.com/news/americas/21731019-presidents-mysterious-announceme
nt-raises-more-questions-it-answers-venezuela-asks.
167. ICSID, List of Contracting States, supra note 90, at 5.
168. See Richard Cooper & Boaz Morag, Crystallex’s Implications For Holders Of Venezuelan
Debt, LAW 360 (Jan. 9, 2018), https://etron.lls.edu:2195/articles/999954/crystallex-s-implicationsfor-holders-of-venezuelan-debt; Venezuela asks its creditors to renegotiate its vast debt, supra note
169. Ripinsky, supra note 133.
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protect its foreign held assets. Yet, it has little incentive to honor awards
for fear of its international reputation or pay out of respect for its
obligations as a former party to the ICSID convention—a system it has
denounced.170 For this reason, Venezuela is incompatible with the ICSID
system.
v. Venezuela is More Dangerous to Investors Than Argentina
It is helpful to compare Argentina in the 2000s to Venezuela today
to understand why the ICSID system of dispute resolution and award will
not work with Venezuela. Like Argentina following its 2000 economic
crisis, Venezuela is facing insolvency. 171 Insolvency means that any
ICSID claimant trying to recover will be up against two obstacles. First,
a claimant will be up against a country with few attachable assets at home
or abroad. Second, a claimant will be competing with the country’s other
creditors, whether they are sovereign debt holders or otherwise. This
crowded field reduces the chances for, and the amount of, any potential
recovery against Venezuela. In addition, Venezuela, like Argentina
before it, has been an active participant in the ICSID dispute process.
It is evident that Venezuela is using Argentina’s ICSID method:
deny and delay.172 Venezuela has denied wrongdoing at every step of the
arbitration and enforcement process and delayed enforcement by using
every procedural and substantive challenge available.173 The results have
been good for both countries.174 It is good in the sense that the countries
succeeded in postponing payment on ICSID awards for years, denying
expropriated investors financial relief and discouraging future claimants
from trying themselves.175 For example, Argentina had not paid CMS
Energy, its first claimant to receive an ICSID award following the 2001
Argentine crisis, as of 2009.176 That was eight years after the crisis, four
years after the award, and two years after a review of that award.177 This
example shows that Argentina’s efforts to resist payment from within the
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.

See id.
See Venezuela asks its creditors to renegotiate its vast debt, supra note 168.
See Posses, supra note 16.
Crystallex Int’l Corp, ICSID Award, ¶¶ 426, 485.
See Come and get me: Argentina is putting international arbitration to the test, THE
ECONOMIST (Feb. 18, 2012), http://www.economist.com/node/21547836; Argentina settles five
investment treaty awards, ALLEN & OVERY (Nov. 7, 2013), http://www.allenovery.com
/publications/en-gb/Pages/Argentina-settles-five-investment-treaty-awards.aspx.
175. See Argentina settles five investment treaty awards, supra note 174.
176. See Come and get me: Argentina is putting international arbitration to the test, supra note
177. See Luke Eric Peterson, Argentine crisis arbitration awards pile up, but investors still wait
for a payout, BILATERALS.ORG (June 25, 2009), http://bilaterals.org/?argentine-crisisarbitration&lang=fr.
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ICSID system worked successfully. Argentina did not settle with CMS
Energy until 2013.178 As we will later explore through the Crystallex case,
Venezuela might be taking a similar path in the present day. In sum, the
ICSID system will likely fail to deliver what investors expect they are
owed from Venezuela.
There are some notable differences between Venezuela and
Argentina that would further affect Venezuela’s status as an ICSID
participant. In addition to the similarities with Argentina’s economic
situation and litigation strategy, Venezuela has followed through and
denounced the ICSID system.179 Argentina disapproved of the alternative
dispute process during its financial hardships, but it remained a
contracting party to ICSID.180 This inaction indicates that Argentina cared
about its international reputation. Venezuela’s government does not seem
to care about its international standing among “Western” states or about
alienating foreign investors to the same degree as Argentina.181 This point
is evidenced by Venezuela’s denouncement of ICSID.182 Traditionally, a
contracting member’s regard for its international standing acts as a soft
check ensuring a host state pays out on awards.183 Without regard for its
international standing, the Venezuelan government is less likely to pay
out.184 Next, the chance of Venezuela complying is lower because its
government has denounced the ICSID Convention because its leaders
disagreed with the principles behind it.185 Venezuela is also less likely to
pay out because it probably does not fear being shunned by the
international community for failing to honor the ICSID awards because
the country is already heavily sanctioned by large players, such as the
United States.186 In this respect, Venezuela is less compatible with the
ICSID system than Argentina. This incompatibility poses a challenge for
Venezuela’s claimants and for the ICSID system in general.

178. See Herbert, Smith & Freehills LLP, Argentina settles five outstanding investment treaty
arbitration claims in historic break with its anti-enforcement stance, LEXOLOGY (Oct. 14, 2013),
https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=5546cffa-46d3-4421-a47d-e86817aee4e5.
179. ICSID, List of Contracting States, supra note 90, at 5.
180. Id. at 1; Wiel, supra note 101.
181. See Ripinsky, supra note 133.
182. See Ferrero, supra note 123.
183. See MOSES, supra note 33, at 238; Georges R. Delaume, ICSID Arbitration Proceedings,
4 INT’L TAX & BUS. LAW 218, 229 (1986).
184. See Delaume, supra note 183, at 229; see generally MOSES, supra note 33, at 238.
185. See Ripinsky, supra note 133.
186. See Delaume, supra note 183, at 229; see, e.g., Matt Spetalnick et al., U.S. Considering
broad oil sanctions on Venezuela-source, REUTERS (Feb. 28, 2018), https://www.reuters.com
/article/us-venezuela-usa-sanctions-exclusive/exclusive-u-s-considering-broad-oil-sanctions-onvenezuela-source-idUSKCN1GD3LR.
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Another difference between Venezuela and Argentina is that
Venezuela is more resource-abundant than Argentina.187 This fact is
significant for two reasons. First, resource-abundant developing countries
operate around their wealth of natural resources. Venezuela happens to
sit on the world’s largest proven oil reserves.188 In addition to oil, the
country has a wealth of minerals, such as gold deposits. 189 Resource-rich
developing countries often need foreign companies with the capital and
knowhow to exploit these reserves—these host countries are particularly
attractive for foreign direct investment in the energy and mining
sectors.190 As a result, these developing countries host more foreign
investors, and those investors rely on ICSID to protect their substantial,
immobile investments.191 For investors in natural resources within
Venezuela, Chávez’s expropriation of entire sectors left foreign investors
dependent on ICSID for protection and compensation.192 Because of the
nature of these investments, the amount in controversy was much larger
than it was in Argentina.193 Venezuela expropriated investments worth
billions rather than millions of dollars.194 Furthermore, the number of
these high value claimants far exceeded the number of high value
claimants against Argentina.195 This fact matters because this amount
constitutes the dollar figure that ICSID will be strained to protect on
behalf of these investors, dollars that must be collected from Venezuela,
a country that is less willing to be collected from than Argentina.
Second, Venezuela being resource rich has important implications
for Venezuela’s exposure to execution attempts on assets abroad. A stateowned oil company, such as PDVSA, likely needs assets in other
countries to continue its operations overseas. These assets then become
targets for the sovereign’s creditors and claimants abroad.
Notwithstanding legal fictions between a sovereign and a state-owned
enterprise, the exposure of these foreign-held assets incentivizes
Venezuela to vigorously defend against execution attempts in a way that
187. Crystallex Int’l Corp, ICSID Award, ¶ 6.
188. See Matthew DiLallo, This OPEC Country has the Largest Proven Oil Reserves, FOX
BUS. (Apr. 22, 2017), http://www.foxbusiness.com/markets/2017/04/22/this-opec-country-haslargest-proven-oil-reserves-and-it-not-saudi-arabia.html.
189. Crystallex Int’l Corp, ICSID Award, ¶ 6.
190. See ICSID 2017-1 Caseload Statistics, supra note 60, at 1.
191. See id.
192. See DiLallo, supra note 188.
193. See e.g., Crystallex Int’l Corp, ICSID Award, ¶ 6 (finding Venezuela owed Crystallex
over $1,202,000,000,000); Argentina settles five investment treaty awards, supra note 174 (writing
about five Argentinian ICSID awards ranging from $165,000,000 down to $2,800,000).
194. See generally, Crystallex Int’l Corp, ICSID Award, ¶6.
195. ROJAS & MALDONADO, supra note 164, at 1; Come and get me: Argentina is putting
international arbitration to the test, supra note 174.
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Argentina did not because it lacked state-owned enterprises operating
abroad. There are two conclusions that can be drawn from this discussion.
First, Venezuela has an incentive to thwart the execution of awards on its
assets to a high cost. Second, Venezuela’s creditors, unlike Argentina’s
creditors, may have another source of treasure from which to take their
award, the state petrol company’s assets. This feat will require litigation
and favorable new case law that whittles away at the legal fiction that
separates the sovereign from its state-owned enterprises’ subsidiaries.196
This note will touch on these ideas more in Part V.
vi. Venezuela Poses a Threat to the ICSID System and International
Investment in Developing Countries
Venezuela’s participation in the ICISD system may have adverse
consequences if Venezuela succeeds at not compensating investors from
whom the Venezuela government has expropriated investments. There
exist other contracting parties to ICSID much like Venezuela.197 These
parties are developing countries that are rich in natural resources or host
quickly expanding markets. The countries’ current leaders may advocate
for globalization and encourage foreign investment. However, as seen
with Venezuela, a downturn in the economy or a regime change can lead
to an entirely different climate in the host state. In Venezuela, socialism
led to nationalization and the expropriation of massive amounts of foreign
direct investment.198 If Venezuela manages to use the ICSID system to
thwart compensation of the expropriated investors in Venezuela, that will
set a precedent for contracting parties to ICSID worldwide. So far, the
ICSID system has provided wronged investors with an alternative forum
and a way to collect on a host state’s foreign assets. The rest of this article
will explore whether the owners of investments expropriated by
Venezuela’s government will be able to rely on this system to be
compensated or if Venezuela’s keen participation in the process and
attempts to delay will undermine investors’ expectations of protection
and compensation.
To summarize, Venezuela plays by the rules while it stalls—at every
chance it gets—by putting up procedural or litigation-related roadblocks.
Meanwhile, Venezuela’s government has been repatriating its assets,
distancing itself from its oil company’s assets, and bracing to default on
196. See Cooper & Morag, supra note 168.
197. See ICSID, List of Contracting States, supra note 90; IMF, Macroeconomic Policy
Frameworks for Resource-Rich Developing Countries, supra note 19 (listing resource rich
countries that include ICSID contracting parties on pages 48 and 49).
198. Factbox: Venezuela’s nationalizations under Chávez, supra note 133.
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its foreign debt. Venezuela’s stance and status make it incompatible with
the ICSID system. This incompatibility could lead to trouble for many
investors relying on ICSID to recover from Venezuela post-Chávez.
Crystallex’s struggles illustrate this point.
III. THE ICSID DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROCESS IS EQUIPPED TO HANDLE
MATTERS BETWEEN INVESTORS AND UNCOOPERATIVE STATES UP TO THE
AWARD STAGE AS SHOWN BY CRYSTALLEX V. VENEZUELA
Part III will state the facts of the dispute that arose between
Crystallex and the Venezuelan government over the right to exploit Las
Cristinas and its vast gold deposits. This Part also highlights the ICSID
dispute, the claims, and the Tribunal’s award. Part III concludes by
analyzing the upsides and downsides of ICSID arbitration for the parties
in this dispute.
A. This Dispute Arises from Venezuela’s Expropriation of Las Cristinas
Mine from Crystallex
The Crystallex v. Venezuela fight originates from disputed rights to
land in a forested region of the State of Bolívar in the Guayana region of
southeast Venezuela.199 The “Las Cristinas” area sits within the Imataca
National Forest Reserve.200 This land sits on some of the largest proven
gold deposits in the world.201 However, when Crystallex acquired the
rights to exploit any mineral reserves under Las Cristinas, few knew
about the rich gold deposits, that is, other than illegal miners.202 These
miners’ unsavory ventures encouraged the government to reclaim the
mineral rights to Las Cristinas from the previous owner in 2002.203
The redistribution of the mining rights brings our parties into the
mix.204 Venezuela’s Ministry of Energy and Mines (“Ministry of Mines”)
administered the government’s natural resources at the national level. 205
The Corporación Venezolana de Guayana (the “CVG”) operated at the
state level as a state-run corporation for Guayana.206 The government
chartered CVG to grow the economy of the region.207 In this case, the
Ministry of Mines entered into an administrative agreement with CVG
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.

Crystallex Int’l Corp, ICSID Award, ¶ 6.
Id.
Id. ¶¶ 6, 54.
Id. ¶¶ 10, 196.
Id. ¶¶ 10-11.
Id. ¶¶ 7-18.
Id.
Id. ¶ 7.
Id.
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concerning the Las Cristinas deposits in April of 2002.208 This agreement
left CVG in charge of partnering with a company to exploit the land.209
In turn, CVG executed a Mine Operation Contract (“MOC”) with
Crystallex that September.210 The MOC highlighted the rights and
obligations of both parties.211 In short, Crystallex was to develop the mine
at its own expense, invest in the local community, and provide $15
million in consideration.212 In exchange, Crystallex would receive “the
proceeds deriving from the sale of its gold production.”213 This process
would require Crystallex to satisfy many regulatory requirements.214 The
MOC obligated CVG to help see Crystallex through the process by
obtaining the requisite permits and by acting as the intermediary between
the Canadian miners and Venezuela’s mining and environmental
agencies.215 The parties satisfied their obligations without issue from
2002–2007, allowing Crystallex to request Autorización Para Afectar
Recursos Naturales (the “Permit”).216
Crystallex could not begin operations until the Ministry of
Environment issued a permit authorizing mining. 217 However, this
permitting application came last. The Permit would have followed the
Ministry’s approval of the Environmental Impact Statement.218 Yet, the
Ministry did not issue the Permit in 2007, and from June 2007, the parties
waited on the Ministry’s decision.219 Shortly thereafter, the global
recession started.220 In April 2008, the Ministry denied Crystallex’s
Permit application.221 After that, the Ministry denied Crystallex’s motion
for reconsideration on the Permit.222 What should have been a routine
approval had turned into the Ministry’s denial for environmental reasons
and a concern for the indigenous people.223
208. Id. ¶¶ 15-16.
209. Id. ¶¶ 16-17.
210. Id. ¶ 18.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id. ¶ 21 (listing the requirements: securing Land Occupation Permits, drafting a Feasibility
Study, preparing an Environmental Impact Study, posting a construction compliance guarantee
bond, and paying environmental taxes).
215. Id. ¶ 19.
216. Id. ¶¶ 21, 42.
217. Id. ¶ 21.
218. Id.
219. Id. ¶¶ 42-44.
220. See generally JOHAN A. LYBECK, A GLOBAL HISTORY OF THE FINANCIAL CRASH OF
2007–10 (2011) (chronicling each important day in the global financial crisis of 2007 to 2010).
221. Id. ¶ 44.
222. Id. ¶ 46.
223. Id. ¶ 44.
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President Chávez and other leaders made public statements about
Las Cristinas while Crystallex fought to secure the Permit.224 Some of the
exhibits presented by Crystallex to ICSID highlight the public statements
made about Las Cristinas in 2008.225 For example, in September 2008, El
Universal quoted President Chávez telling the public, “In Guayana, we
are taking back big mines, and one of them is one of the biggest in the
world . . . it’s gold!”226 In November, the Minister of Mines said that the
“State would take back, operate, and manage the Las Cristinas mine,”
formerly owned by Crystallex within a year (2009).227 At this time,
Crystallex’s MOC agreement was in effect, and the Ministry of
Environment continued corresponding with Crystallex about its efforts to
obtain the Permit.228 In 2010, Chávez announced that Las Cristinas had
been handed over to transnational companies but that “the revolutionary
government recuperated it” because “these mineral resources [were] for
the Venezuelan people, [and] not for transnationals.”229
CVG rescinded its MOC with Crystallex in February 2011.230 The
CVG rescinded through a clause that granted permission to rescind the
contract when all activity ceased for a year.231 Crystallex could not act
without the Permit.232 Crystallex could file a Request for Arbitration
against Venezuela with the ICSID per Article XII of the BIT.233 And so,
Crystallex filed its request that same week.234
B. The Tribunal Ruled on the Merits and Awarded Crystallex
1,202,000,000 USD
February 2011 marked the start of a five-year dispute between
Crystallex and Venezuela at ICSID.235 The proceeding began with
Venezuela’s jurisdictional challenges to ICSID having jurisdiction over
the dispute. Recall that Part II of this article covered the CanadaVenezuela BIT in which the parties opted for ICSID as the forum of
choice.236 This option allowed the Tribunal to resolve all jurisdictional
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.

Id. ¶¶ 47-58.
Id. ¶¶ 50-56.
Id. ¶¶ 50.
Id. ¶¶ 51.
Id. ¶¶ 46, 53.
Id. ¶ 58.
Id. ¶ 59.
Id.
Id. ¶ 21.
Can.-Venez. BIT, supra note 46, art. XII.
Crystallex Int’l Corp, ICSID Award, ¶ 61.
Id.
Can.-Venez. BIT, supra note 46, art. XII.
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issues quickly.237 Crystallex made three claims based on Venezuela’s
failure to comply with its guarantees under the Canada-Venezuela BIT.238
The Tribunal found for Crystallex on two counts in its April 2016 Award
(the “Award”).239 The Award stated that Venezuela owed Crystallex
1,202,000,000 USD plus interest.240
Crystallex succeeded on the merits for two out of its three claims
against Venezuela.241 The claims came from law established in the
Canada-Venezuela BIT discussed earlier on.242 First, Crystallex claimed
that Venezuela denied it “Fair and Equitable Treatment” (“FET”) under
Article II(2).243 Second, Crystallex claimed that Venezuela denied the
investment “Full Protection and Security” under Article II(2). 244 Finally,
Crystallex claimed that Venezuela expropriated its investment under
Article VII(1).245 The Tribunal found that Venezuela had violated its
promise to treat Crystallex “fairly and equitably” and found that
Venezuela had expropriated its investment.246
The Tribunal’s analysis of the FET claim hinged on the Ministry of
Environment’s denial of the Permit.247 The Tribunal began by explaining
that the FET clause protected Crystallex’s legitimate expectations against
arbitrariness, a lack of transparency, and inconsistent government
actions.248 Crystallex had a legitimate expectation that the Permit would
be reviewed fairly after the company met the requirements and posted its
bond.249 And Venezuela “engaged in arbitrary conduct in denying the
Permit and rescinding the MOC.”250 The vague reasons for denial
indicated a lack of transparency.251 Thus, Venezuela’s actions in denying
the Permit violated the FET clause of the BIT treaty.252
Next, the Tribunal decided that Venezuela had expropriated
Crystallex’s investment without just compensation.253 Article VII(1) of
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.

Crystallex Int’l Corp, ICSID Award, ¶ 426.
Id. ¶¶ 7, 485.
Id. ¶ 961.
Id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 1; see generally Can.-Venez. BIT, supra note 46, art. XII.
Can.-Venez. BIT, supra note 46, art. II; Crystallex Int’l Corp, ICSID Award, ¶ 485.
Can.-Venez. BIT, supra note 46, art. II; Crystallex Int’l Corp, ICSID Award, ¶ 485.
Crystallex Int’l Corp, ICSID Award, ¶ 485.
Id. ¶ 961.
Id. ¶ 623.
Id. ¶ 543.
Id. ¶ 557.
Id. ¶ 623.
Id. ¶¶ 590-91.
Id. ¶ 623.
Id. ¶¶ 674-688, 714, 718.
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the treaty provides “that any expropriation must be carried out (i) for
public purposes, (ii) under due process of law, (iii) in a nondiscriminatory manner and (iv) against prompt, adequate and effective
compensation.”254 The denial of the Permit and rescission of the MOC
constituted an expropriation of Crystallex’s investment.255 The Tribunal
respected (i) the public purpose of the expropriation to “reclaim” the mine
for the people and (ii) found no due process concerns.256 The Tribunal’s
expropriation analysis leant the earlier FET analysis (iii) to find
discrimination.257 However, the dispositive issue came from the failure of
Venezuela to provide Crystallex any compensation.258 The Tribunal
found (iv) that no “adequate and effective compensation” had been
provided to Crystallex.259 And so, the Tribunal set about calculating “the
genuine value of the investment” at the time of expropriation.260
The Tribunal awarded Crystallex 1,202,000,000 USD in damages in
April of 2016.261 The Tribunal determined Crystallex’s reparations by
calculating the fair market value of the investment at the time of
expropriation.262 The Tribunal used the average of the Stock Market
Approach and the Market Multiples Approach to come up with
1,202,000,000 USD.263 That figure represents the fair market value of the
investment at the time when Venezuela denied the Permit, making the
valuation date April 13, 2008.264 Up to the award stage, the BIT and
Tribunal functioned to provide Crystallex the protection it expected from
the system.
C. The Dispute Highlights the Advantage of Pursuing Five Years of
ICSID Arbitration but also the Substantial Costs Connected to ICSID
Arbitration
To sum up this section, Crystallex worked from 2002 to 2007 to
prepare mining Las Cristinas.265 Crystallex surveyed the gold reserves,
complied with regulatory filings, and invested in the local community at

254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.

Id. ¶ 711; Can.-Venez. BIT, supra note 46, art. VII.
Crystallex Int’l Corp, ICSID Award, ¶¶ 674-688, 714.
Id. ¶¶ 712, 715 n. 995.
Id. ¶ 715.
Id. ¶¶ 716-17.
Id. ¶¶ 716-17.
Id. ¶ 660.
Id. ¶ 961.
Id. ¶ 853.
Id. ¶ 917.
Id. ¶ 855.
Id. ¶¶ 21-43, 195.
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a cost of over 500,000,000 USD.266 Venezuela denied Crystallex a Permit
in 2008.267 With a hostile political climate in Venezuela, Crystallex
brought its expropriation claim at ICSID by way of the CanadianVenezuelan BIT.268 The ICSID Tribunal granted Crystallex
1,202,000,000 USD in damages for Venezuela’s expropriation of its
investment in 2016.269 Crystallex left five years of arbitration armed with
a billion dollar award but incurred over 30,000,000 USD in legal fees and
1,000,000 USD in arbitration fees.270 Possessing the Award, Crystallex
found a litigation financier willing to fund the collection stage of the
process, in exchange for 35% of any return.271 Concurrently, Venezuela
paid over 14,000,000 USD in legal fees and 974,000 USD in arbitration
fees.272 In hindsight, Venezuela’s greater-than-14,000,000 USD payment
was money well spent as Venezuela bought itself another four years to
avoid paying out for expropriating Las Cristinas. After all, an ICSID
award is just a piece of paper, . . . and Crystallex still had to collect.
IV. CRYSTALLEX REGISTERED ITS AWARD IN THE U.S. COURT WITHOUT
ISSUE; EXECUTING ON VENEZUELA’S ASSETS IS THE PROBLEM
Crystallex chose to register its Award in the United States. 273 Section
Six of the ICSID Convention provides for the recognition and
enforcement of an award.274 Within Section Six, Article 53 provides that
the “award shall be binding on all parties and shall not be subject to
appeal.”275 Article 54 provides that a contracting state must also recognize
that an award is binding on the parties.276 It also provides that a state must
enforce any monetary damages imposed by that award as if the damages
came from a final judgment from a domestic court.277 Here, Article 53
binds Venezuela and Crystallex to the results of the Award.278 And
Venezuela cannot appeal the substance of the decision in its own court or
in the court of another contracting state.279 Crystallex had the ability to
266. Id. ¶¶ 21-45, 195.
267. Id. ¶ 44.
268. Id. ¶ 1.
269. Id. ¶ 961.
270. Id. ¶ 949.
271. Litigation Funding Paves Way for Crystallex’s $1.4B Award Against Venezuela, supra
note 11, at 1.
272. Crystallex Int’l Corp, ICSID Award, ¶ 950.
273. Crystallex Int’l Corp, 244 F. Supp. 3d at 105.
274. ICSID Convention, supra note 39, arts. 53-55.
275. See id. art. 53.
276. See id. art. 54.
277. See id.
278. See id. art. 53.
279. See id.
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register the Award in any contracting state.280 Crystallex chose to register
its award in the United States, a contracting party to ICSID. 281 Crystallex
likely chose to register in the United States because of the amount of
business the Venezuelan state oil companies’ subsidiaries do in the
United States.282 Judge Rudolph Contreras of the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia recognized the Award in March of
2017.283 The Court’s recognition of the Award satisfied the United States’
obligations as a contracting party to ICSID under Article 54.284 The
recognition also allowed Crystallex access to other UNITED STATES
jurisdictions in its quest to seek enforcement.285 For Crystallex,
registration placed it closer to collecting from Venezuela. For Venezuela,
Venezuelan counsel could not do much to stop the recognition
mechanism because it is well defined by the ICSID Convention. 286 And
so, while Venezuela could not appeal the Award or its recognition in the
United States, Venezuela could bring other actions to frustrate
Crystallex’s efforts to collect.
The United States’ recognition of the Award does not guarantee a
payout. There exists a distinction between the “recognition or
enforcement” of an award and the “execution” of an award.287 Article
54(c) says that, “execution of the award shall be governed by the laws
concerning the execution of judgments in force in the state in whose
territories such execution is sought.”288 “ICSID itself has no formal role
in the recognition and enforcement of an award under the ICSID
Convention.”289 Article 55 clarifies that ICSID does not override
domestic law related to the execution of money damages against a
sovereign’s assets.290 And so, for Crystallex to execute its Award on
specific Venezuelan assets held in the United States, Crystallex’s
attorneys must navigate United States’ sovereign immunity law.
Under United States Federal Law, “the property in the United States
of a foreign state shall be immune from attachment arrest and
280. See id. art. 54.
281. Database of ICSID Member States, supra note 122.
282. See infra Part VI.
283. Crystallex Int’l Corp, 244 F. Supp. 3d at 122.
284. ICSID Convention, supra note 39, art. 54.
285. See Miner Crystallex inches forward in legal dispute with Venezuela, REUTERS (June 12,
2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/venezuela-crystallex-idUSL1N1J90UP.
286. ICSID Convention, supra note 39, art. 54.
287. Id. arts. 54-55; MOSES, supra note 33, at 237.
288. See ICSID Convention, supra note 39, art. 54(3).
289. Recognition and Enforcement, ICSID, https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/process
/Recognition-and-Enforcement-Convention-Arbitration.aspx(last visited Sept. 8, 2018).
290. ICSID Convention, supra note 39, art. 55; Recognition and Enforcement, supra note 289.
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execution.”291 Sovereign immunity applies to both foreign states and the
agencies or instrumentalities of the foreign state.292 An agency or
instrumentality of a foreign state includes any entity that is “a separate
legal person,” and that is “an organ of a foreign state” or “a majority of
whose shares or other ownership interest is owned by a foreign state,”
and that is neither a citizen of the UNITED STATES nor is created under
the laws of a third country.293 Here, the foreign state subject to sovereign
immunity would be Venezuela. Additionally, Venezuela’s state-owned
oil company, PDVSA, is considered to be a state instrumentality and is
afforded sovereign immunity. So we know that generally Venezuelan
assets are shielded by sovereign immunity in the United States. Section
1610, however, provides specific exceptions that may apply in Crystallex
and Venezuela’s situation.
Congress provided exceptions to a sovereign’s immunity from
attachment or execution in 28 U.S.C. § 1610.294 The exception that applies
here is found in § 1610(a)(6) and is as follows:
(a) The property in the United States of a foreign state used for a
commercial activity in the United States shall not be immune from
attachment in aid of execution, or from execution, upon a judgment
entered by a court of the United States . . . if, (6) the judgment is based
on an order confirming an arbitral award rendered against the foreign
state, provided that attachment in aid of execution, or execution, would
not be inconsistent with any provision of the arbitral agreement.295
This exception contains several notable elements. The property
must be used for a “commercial activity in the United States.” 296 “A
‘commercial activity’ means either a regular course of commercial
conduct or a particular commercial transaction or act.”297 If a sovereign
has property in the United States and uses that property in the United
States for a commercial activity, then the exception to sovereign
immunity applies and the property is executable.298 In a similar spirit, the
property of a state instrumentality that engages in commercial activity
may also lose sovereign immunity and that renders it executable.299 This
commercial-activity-related property can be distinguished from a
291.
292.
293.
294.
295.
296.
297.
298.
299.

28 U.S.C.S. § 1609 (LEXIS through P.L. No. 115-230).
28 U.S.C.S. § 1603(a) (LEXIS through P.L. No. 115-230).
28 U.S.C.S. § 1603(b).
28 U.S.C.S. § 1610 (LEXIS through P.L. No. 115-230).
28 U.S.C.S. § 1610(a)(6).
28 U.S.C.S. § 1610(a).
28 U.S.C.S. § 1603(d).
28 U.S.C.S. § 1610(a).
28 U.S.C.S. § 1610(b).
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sovereign’s property used for a public activity, i.e., when the assets would
be used to conduct the government’s over-sea operations.300 Next, §
1610(a)(6) says that a judgment from an arbitral award can be executed
on a sovereign’s assets used for a commercial activity.301 In the Crystallex
matter, any property that Venezuela has in the United States that is used
for a commercial activity in the United States is executable. However,
that is not true of the property of Venezuela’s state instrumentality,
PDVSA, because that entity does not operate in the United States.
Instead, the PDVSA operates in the United States through its corporate
subsidiaries incorporated in Delaware.302
Delaware corporate law requires PDVSA’s Delaware subsidiaries
to be treated as independent from PDVSA and Venezuela.303 PDVSA is
the parent company of PDV Holding Inc., a Delaware Corporation.304
PDV Holding Inc. is the parent company of CITGO Holding, Inc. 305
CITGO Holding, Inc. currently owns 100% of the capital stock of Citgo
Petroleum Corporation and 100% of the LLC interests of several other
petroleum companies operating in the United States. 306 The Oklahomabased Citgo Petroleum Corporation generated “$42.3 billion and earnings
before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization (EBITDA) in 2013
. . . .”307 The point being that Venezuela, through its state-owned oil
company subsidiaries, has a wealth of assets in the United States.
Crystallex cannot easily execute on the property of PDVSA’s subsidiaries
under the current law.308 The law forces Crystallex to either enforce on
Venezuelan assets subject to § 1610(a)(6) or push the boundaries of the
law by attempting to execute on assets related to the PDVSA’s
subsidiaries. Crystallex did both.
In sum, sovereign immunity presented a challenge for Crystallex in
its effort to execute its Award on Venezuelan assets in the United States
300. 28 U.S.C.S. § 1603(d).
301. 28 U.S.C.S. § 1610(a)(6).
302. ORGANIGRAMA: Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. [Organization Chart: Petróleos de
Venezuela, S.A.], PDVSA, http://www.pdvsa.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=
article&id=6537&Itemid=570&lang=es (last visited Feb. 4, 2018) (Venez.).
303. Wallace v. Wood, 752 A.2d 1175, 1175 (Del. Ch. 1999).
304. Organization Chart: Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A., supra note 302.
305. See id.
306. See Rating Action: Moody’s downgrades ratings of CITGO Petroleum and CITGO
Holding, MOODY’S INV. SERV. (Nov. 7, 2017), https://www.moodys.com/research/Moodysdowngrades-ratings-of-CITGO-Petroleum-and-CITGO-Holding—PR_375010.
307. See Citgo Holding Inc: Company Profile, BLOOMBERG, https://www.bloomberg.com
/profiles/companies/5368Z:US-citgo-holding-inc (last visited Feb. 04, 2018); CITGO No Longer
on the Market, CSP DAILY NEWS (Jan. 21, 2015), http://www.cspdailynews.com/industry-newsanalysis/corporate-news/articles/citgo-no-longer-market.
308. Wallace, 752 A.2d at 1183.
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as the United States sovereign immunity law provided a potent strategy
of avoidance for Venezuela. This dynamic presents a challenge for an
ICSID claimant dealing with an incompatible state—a challenge that is
explored in Part V.
V. THE ICSID SYSTEM FOR ENFORCEMENT STRUGGLES TO INCENTIVIZE
INCOMPATIBLE STATES TO HONOR JUDGEMENTS
The ICSID system struggles to incentivize or force incompatible
states to pay up on Awards rendered against them. This Part will focus
on the payment of ICSID awards by sovereign states. First, we will look
at the ideal situation. Second, we will look at how states have traditionally
complied. Third, we will look at what happened when Argentina could
not pay and refused to honor judgments against it. Finally, we will
examine how Venezuela created a situation which the ICSID framers did
not anticipate: the execution of awards against a defiant but “compliant”
state.
A. Ideally, a State Honors the ICSID Judgment Against It
Ideally, a state honors an ICSID award recognized against it in any
contracting state’s legal system. Margaret Moses pointed out several
reasons for this assumption in International Commercial Arbitration.309
First, states voluntarily contracted to join ICSID in the hopes of
benefiting from foreign investment.310 Second, states that want to
continue to receive the benefits of foreign direct investment should
comply to maintain their reputation internationally. 311 Moses observed
that states that want to continue to receive the benefit of World Bank
loans would not shirk the World Bank’s arbitration center’s awards.312
Moreover, “a state’s noncompliance with an ICSID award exposes that
state to various sanctions set forth in the Convention.”313
B. Traditionally, States Did Honor ICSID Awards
Traditionally, states have honored ICSID judgments rendered
against them.314 Speaking in the mid-1980s, the late Georges Delaume, a
senior legal advisor to ICSID, stated that “in practice . . . the problems
309.
310.
311.
312.
313.
183.
314.

MOSES, supra note 33.
See id at 9.
See id. at 238.
See id.
ICSID Convention, supra note 39, art. 64; MOSES, supra note 33; Delaume, supra note
See MOSES, supra note 33.
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attendant to the doctrine of sovereign immunity . . . are only theoretical”
because “no ICSID award to date has been the object of enforcement
proceedings.”315 Delaume, encouraged by states’ active participation in
ICSID proceedings, believed that a state’s participation in arbitration
would lead to its “increased willingness either to comply with the award
or to reach a settlement with the investor.”316 So states voluntarily opted
for ICSID, rowed in ICSID, and honored ICSID judgments to preserve
their international reputations and to access to foreign capital.317 That
generally proved to be the case until Argentina’s financial crisis of
2001.318
C. Lately, Argentina Could Not Pay and Avoided Honoring Awards
The expectation that all states would willingly pay out on an ICSID
award crashed alongside the Argentine economy in 2001. Insolvent
Argentina disapproved of the ICSID system and indicated that it would
put the interests of its people before those of foreign investors. 319
Argentina pioneered several “diversionist tactics” and “succeeded in
avoiding payment of every award rendered in favor of investors.” 320
Argentina’s leaders unapologetically put Argentina before the sanctity of
the ICSID system.321 To Argentina, considerations such as preserving its
international reputation, paying out for the sake of fairness, or even its
long-term access to foreign capital markets, fell to the wayside of its
domestic goal of supporting its people by restoring its economy. 322
Argentina had little choice but to challenge, evade, and eventually
settle ICSID claims against it. The economy had crashed and many
people lived in poverty.323 In 2007, Charity Goodman wrote about how
economic crisis and states like Argentina posed a threat to ICSID. 324 In
2018, Venezuela poses an even more serious threat. The Venezuelan
government nationalized many industries and expropriated foreign
investments while a wealthy country under Chávez.325 In 2012, it
315. See Delaume, supra note 183.
316. See id.
317. See MOSES, supra note 33.
318. Goodman, supra note 108, at 453.
319. Id. at 479.
320. See Ferrero, supra note 123; Goodman, supra note 108, at 480.
321. Ferrero, supra note 123; Goodman, supra note 108, at 480.
322. Ferrero, supra note 123; Goodman, supra note 108, at 480.
323. HARTEN, supra note 97, at 1-2.
324. Goodman, supra note 108, at 449.
325. The World Bank In Venezuela: Overview, WORLD BANK, http://www.worldbank.org
/en/country/venezuela/overview (last visited Dec. 21, 2017).
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denounced the ICSID Convention to stop future claims.326 Since that time,
the government’s policies have resulted in its economic collapse.327 As of
Quarter 4 of 2017, Venezuela was practically insolvent; Venezuela was
not insolvent at the time of the expropriation in 2007 nor at the time that
Crystallex received its Award in 2016.328 Yet, while facing insolvency,
Venezuela still actively disputes claims against it, using many of the legal
tactics that Argentina implemented successfully to delay payment and
force settlement.329 Venezuela’s political and economic status combined
with its vigorous avoidance of paying ICSID awards makes Venezuela
incompatible with ICSID.
D. Now, Venezuela Created a Situation that the ICSID Framers Did
Not Anticipate: The Execution of Awards Against a “Defiant” but
“Compliant” State
Crystallex first settled with the Venezuelan government for an
undisclosed amount on November 23, 2017.330 Under the agreement,
Crystallex agreed to suspend its efforts to enforce the Award.331 The
settlement came after Crystallex made several attempts to execute on
Venezuelan assets located in the United States.332 This effort required
multi-front litigation in several United States federal district courts,
including in the District of Columbia, New York, and Delaware.333
Venezuela used procedural and substantive tactics to defend and delay
payment on the 1,202,000,000 USD award.334 While Venezuela resisted
the ICSID award enforcement proceedings, its government scraped
together enough money to make payments on its sovereign debt and the
debt owed by its oil company, PDVSA.335 In November 2017, Venezuela
became insolvent on its sovereign debt.336 The wealthy Venezuela that
expropriated Crystallex’s investment ten years earlier no longer existed,
which left Crystallex with little choice but to ditch the ICSID system and
to settle.

326.
327.
328.
329.
330.
331.
332.
333.
334.
335.
336.

ICSID, List of Contracting States, supra note 90.
HARTEN, supra note 97, at 1.
How Long Can Venezuela Avoid Default, supra note 123.
See supra Part II.
Wheatley, supra note 13.
See Posses, supra note 4.
How Long Can Venezuela Avoid Default, supra note 116; see Posses, supra note 4.
Crosby, supra note 15; Olivo, supra note 15.
Daniels, supra note 15; Posses, supra note 16.
How Long Can Venezuela Avoid Default, supra note 123.
Id.
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After the author submitted this note in March 2017, Crystallex and
Venezuela’s dispute continued in court and to make headlines.337 As of
March 2018, Crystallex continues its efforts to execute on Venezuelan
assets.338 In August 2018, a Delaware District Court allowed Crystallex
seize shares in PDV Holding, Inc.339 As mentioned in Part IV, PDV
Holding, Inc. is a subsidiary of PDVSA and the parent company of Citgo,
and Citgo is a profitable company with United States-based assets.340
Venezuela appealed this “landmark” decision to the Third Circuit.341 The
decision triggered a flurry of action as Venezuela’s other creditors as well
as its bondholders scramble to secure their interests in Venezuela’s
“largest U.S. asset.”342 Another interested party in the Third Circuit case
is Venezuelan opposition leader Juan Guaidó.343 Guaidó objects to
Crystallex’s seizure of the state-owned oil company’s subsidiary’s assets
on foreign policy grounds.344 So the defiant but compliant state continues
on, and the end is not in sight.
VII. CONCLUSION
The result of Crystallex v. Venezuela is unclear. Yet, one thing is
clear. The ICSID system in its current form does not provide wronged
337. See generally Caroline Simson, Citgo Ruling Has Queued Up Brawl Over Venezuelan
Assets, LAW 360 (Aug. 23, 2018), https://www.law360.com/articles/1076307/citgo-ruling-hasqueued-up-brawl-over-venezuelan-assets (landmark decision in Crystallex execution effort);
Caroline Simson, Crystallex, Venezuela Ink Deal Over $ 1.2B Award, LAW 360 (Nov. 26, 2018)
https://www.law360.com/articles/1104684/crystallex-venezuela-ink-deal-over-1-2b-award
(Venezuela and Crystallex settle, again); Caroline Simson, Venezuela Breached Deal Over $1.2B
Award, Crystallex Says, LAW 360 (Dec. 11, 2018), https://www.law360.com/articles
/1110117/venezuela-breached-deal-over-1-2b-award-crystallex-says
(Venezuela
allegedly
breaches terms of settlement); Kaitlyn Burton, Venezuela, Crystallex Spar Over $1.2B Award
Appeal, LAW 360 (Jan. 23, 2019), https://www.law360.com/articles/1120102/venezuela-crystallexspar-over-1-2b-award-appeal (Third Circuit appeal); Philip Reeves, U.S. Recognizes Opposition
Leader as Venezuela’s Head of State, NPR (Jan. 24, 2019), https://www.npr.org
/2019/01/24/688110246/u-s-recognizes-opposition-leader-as-venezuelas-head-of-state
(U.S.
supports Juan Guaidó after he declares himself Venezuela’s president); Caroline Simson, New
Sanctions Throw Wrench At Venezuela’s Creditors, LAW 360 (Jan. 29, 2019),
https://www.law360.com/articles/1123571/new-sanctions-throw-wrench-at-venezuela-s-creditors
(U.S. sanctions PDVSA); Caroline Simson, Guaidó Wants In On 3rd Circ. $1.2B Crystallex Award
Row, LAW 360 (March. 4, 2019), https://www.law360.com/articles/1134694/guaid-wants-in-on3rd-circ-1-2b-crystallex-award-row (Guaidó attempts to intervene in Crystallex suit).
338. Burton, supra note 337; Crystallex Int’l Corp. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, No.
18-2797 (3rd Cir. 2019).
339. Simson, Citgo Ruling Has Queued Up Brawl Over Venezuelan Assets, supra note 337.
340. See supra Part IV; Simson, Citgo Ruling Has Queued Up Brawl Over Venezuelan Assets,
supra note 337.
341. Simson, Citgo Ruling Has Queued Up Brawl Over Venezuelan Assets, supra note 340.
342. Id.
343. Simson, Guaidó Wants In On 3rd Circ. $1.2B Crystallex Award Row, supra note 337.
344. See id.
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investors with all the tools they need to effectively execute ICSID awards
against incompatible states. The current system allows each contracting
party to keep its laws regarding the execution on a sovereign’s assets. For
Venezuela, ICSID’s inadequate execution system coupled with United
States sovereign immunity and corporate law proved effective tools to
undermine Crystallex’s efforts to collect its reward. For Crystallex, the
ICSID system assisted the company from its initial investment up until
the Award. For the execution process, however, the ICSID system left
Crystallex alone to dig deep in search of novel legal grounds within the
United States legal system . . . and, with the Third Circuit decision, it may
have struck gold.

